emptyuniverse

Not-self (Anatta)

In the suttas the Buddha employs two methods of observing and analyzing our experience in order to clearly see our existential situation and bring about discernment (panna). The first method is to empirically observe and categorize the phenomenal components that are the contents of experience (i.e. the eighteen elements of perception, the twelve sensory spheres, and the five aggregations of mental/material phenomena), and to empirically observe the discernible characteristics of these phenomena (i.e. that they are impermanent and prone to suffering). The second method is to discern the causal relationships between these various phenomenal components of experience (i.e. that they are dependently originated according to this/that conditionality, and that suffering is caused by craving, grasping, becoming, and unskillful fabricating).

Then based on these two methods of empirical observation and discernment of causal relationships we can come to understand that all conditioned phenomena are not-self. We conclude that because these phenomena are impermanent, unsatisfactory, prone to dis-ease, and dependently originated, they can't be taken as a 'self' which, by definition, would be permanent, free of suffering, and independent. Therefore, we conclude that they are not-self. Also, we conclude that because these phenomena are continually changing, prone to suffering, and dependent upon causes and conditions, and because this change, suffering, and causal dependency is largely beyond volitional control (volition being just another one of these ever changing and dependent fabrications), phenomena can't be considered the possessions of a self, which by definition, would always be subject to the control of a self. Therefore, we conclude that they do not belong to a self.

Furthermore, we conclude that ignorant identification (avijja) with these various phenomena as being a self and the possessions of a self is the root cause of suffering, because this ignorant identification is the cause of ignorant, unskillful fabrication, craving, grasping, and becoming. We come to understand that this ignorant identification includes ignorance of the this/that conditionality of dependent origination, ignorance of impermanence, ignorance of suffering, and ignorance of not-self. Therefore, we conclude that ignorant identification, unskillful fabricating, craving, grasping, becoming, and suffering would cease when the this/that conditionality of dependent origination, impermanence, suffering, and not-self are properly discerned.

We can now take a closer look at these two methods.

First Method (Analysis of Phenomena):

Firstly, we can observe the perceptual process, as we experience it, and clearly identify the above mentioned eighteen elements. We can then observe and experientially identify the various phenomena that are subcategories of these eighteen elements, most notably the various phenomena of the mental objects element, such as feeling (vedana), perception (sanna), and fabrications (sankhara). We can then observe the various phenomena that make up these three aggregations (pleasant, unpleasant, neutral feelings of the feelings aggregate; memory-recognition of the perception aggregate; verbal fabrications of discursive thinking and speaking; mental fabrications like volition and emotions, etc., of the fabrications aggregate).

Once we have these various phenomena identified and categorized (this analysis doesn't have to be as exhaustive as what's laid out in the Abhidhamma), we can then clearly observe that these phenomena are inconstant, being subject to origination, duration (change), and cessation. Based on this observation we can discern that these phenomena are conditioned and impermanent. We can also clearly see that this impermanent experience fluctuates between experiences of pleasantness, neutrality, and pain: physical pain in the body (as well as illness and eventual death), and mental pain experienced as dissatisfaction, disappointment, anxiety, grief, etc.. Based on this we can discern that whatever is impermanent is prone to suffering. And thus, we have arrived at the first noble truth: the truth of suffering.

Second Method (Synthesis of Phenomena):

Now we can investigate these phenomena to see their causal relationships to one another. As noted above, we can observe that sensory consciousness is dependent upon a sense organ and sense object. If there's no sense organ (if one is deaf for example), or no sense object (the absence of an odor for example), then no sensory consciousness pertaining to that sensory sphere arises. Based on this observation we can discern that all these various phenomena are dependently originated. We can also observe for ourselves how feeling gives rise to craving and aversion, which in turn gives rise to grasping, and that this ongoing grasping gives rise to seemingly endless seeking after pleasant feelings, which is what the Buddha refers to as becoming. Based on this observation we can discern that craving (and aversion) is a cause of suffering, as are grasping and becoming. And thus we have arrived at a partial understanding of the second noble truth: the truth of the origin of suffering, based upon this discernment of this/that conditionality. Furthermore, we can discern that if this craving, etc., were to cease, then it's possible that suffering would also cease. And thus we have a theoretical hypothesis that there could be a truth of the cessation of suffering. (We'll give the truth of origin and the truth of cessation a much more thorough treatment later on.)

Discernment of Anatta Based on Analysis and Synthesis:

Next we come to the point where we can realize that these various conditioned phenomena are not-self, and do not belong to a self. This discernment is essential if we're to discover a pathway leading to the cessation of suffering.

In order to realize that all conditioned phenomena are not-self we need to already have discerned that these conditioned phenomena are: impermanent, unsatisfactory, prone to dis-ease, and various (first method); dependently originated, and not self-determining (second method). Once we've come to see and understand this for ourselves, we can analyze just what would constitute a self as follows: A self would, by definition, be:

1. permanent
2. satisfactory
3. not prone to dis-ease
4. self-determining (be in complete control of itself)

Indeed, whether consciously or sub-consciously, we usually consider our 'self' to be defined by one or more of these characteristics. But under close examination the body and mind are actually discovered to be:

1. impermanent
2. unsatisfactory
3. prone to dis-ease
4. not self-determining

Regarding the first two on this list, the Buddha teaches in the Anatta-lakkhana Sutta (SN: 22.59):

"What do you think, monks — Is form constant or inconstant?"

"Inconstant, lord."

"And is that which is inconstant easeful or stressful?"

"Stressful, lord."

"And is it fitting to regard what is inconstant, stressful, subject to change as: 'This is mine. This is my self. This is what I am'?"

"No, lord."

[This same questioning is repeated for feeling, perception, fabrications, and consciousness.]

"Thus, monks, any body whatsoever that is past, future, or present; internal or external; blatant or subtle; common or sublime; far or near: every body is to be seen as it actually is with right discernment as: 'This is not mine. This is not my self. This is not what I am.'

"Any feeling whatsoever...
"Any perception whatsoever...
"Any fabrications whatsoever...

"Any consciousness whatsoever that is past, future, or present; internal or external; blatant or subtle; common or sublime; far or near: every consciousness is to be seen as it actually is with right discernment as: 'This is not mine. This is not my self. This is not what I am.'"

And regarding the last two from our list — that conditioned phenomena are prone to dis-ease and not self-determining — he says in the same sutta:

Form, monks, is not self. If form were the self, this form would not lend itself to dis-ease. It would be possible [to say] with regard to form, 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' But precisely because form is not self, form lends itself to dis-ease. And it is not possible [to say] with regard to form, 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'

Feeling is not self...
Perception is not self...
[Mental] fabrications are not self...

Consciousness is not self. If consciousness were the self, this consciousness would not lend itself to dis-ease. It would be possible [to say] with regard to consciousness, 'Let my consciousness be thus. Let my consciousness not be thus.' But precisely because consciousness is not self, consciousness lends itself to dis-ease. And it is not possible [to say] with regard to consciousness, 'Let my consciousness be thus. Let my consciousness not be thus.'

Therefore, we can conclude that the aggregations of bodily and mental phenomena that we normally and unquestioningly take to be our 'self,' actually bear none of the attributes which would define a permanent, abiding self. They are quite simply not-self. And because they are not only impermanent and unsatisfactory, but also prone to dis-ease and not self-determining, we can conclude that they are not the possessions of a self, which of course, would be under volitional control and not get sick or die.

Furthermore, to the above list we can also add that a self would, by definition, be:

1. unitary
2. independent

But again, when closely examined, these conditioned phenomena are various (i.e. comprising the five aggregates, twelve sensory spheres, and eighteen elements), and they are all dependently originated and therefore not independent — they are empty of any abiding essence (more on this later).

And so we can conclude that the conditioned phenomena of body and mind are: impermanent, unsatisfactory, prone to dis-ease, not self-determining, various, and dependently originated. They are not-self. They are not 'I' or 'mine.' They are empty of self or what would belong to a self.

Regarding the refutation of self, we can also take a look at the Maha-nidana Sutta (DN: 15). In this sutta the Buddha employs logical argument to demonstrate that any concept of self with regard to feeling (vedana) leads to inconsistency. First he presents three distinct possibilities regarding the self:

1. feeling is my self
2. feeling is not my self: my self is oblivious [to feeling]
3. my self feels, in that my self is subject to feeling

The sutta passage runs as follows:

To what extent, Ananda, does one assume when assuming a self? Assuming feeling to be the self, one assumes that 'Feeling is my self' [or] 'Feeling is not my self: My self is oblivious [to feeling]' [or] 'Neither is feeling my self, nor is my self oblivious to feeling, but rather my self feels, in that my self is subject to feeling.'

If these three possibilities can be refuted, then we can conclude that an empirical self doesn't ultimately exist. Concerning the first, the Buddha states:

Now, one who says, 'Feeling is my self,' should be addressed as follows: 'There are these three feelings, my friend — feelings of pleasure, feelings of pain, and feelings of neither pleasure nor pain. Which of these three feelings do you assume to be the self?' At a moment when a feeling of pleasure is sensed, no feeling of pain or of neither pleasure nor pain is sensed. Only a feeling of pleasure is sensed at that moment. At a moment when a feeling of pain is sensed, no feeling of pleasure or of neither pleasure nor pain is sensed. Only a feeling of pain is sensed at that moment. At a moment when a feeling of neither pleasure nor pain is sensed, no feeling of pleasure or of pain is sensed. Only a feeling of neither pleasure nor pain is sensed at that moment.

Now, a feeling of pleasure is inconstant, fabricated, dependent on conditions, subject to passing away, dissolution, fading, and cessation. A feeling of pain is inconstant, fabricated, dependent on conditions, subject to passing away, dissolution, fading, and cessation. A feeling of neither pleasure nor pain is inconstant, fabricated, dependent on conditions, subject to passing away, dissolution, fading, and cessation. Having sensed a feeling of pleasure as 'my self,' then with the cessation of one's very own feeling of pleasure, 'my self' has perished. Having sensed a feeling of pain as 'my self,' then with the cessation of one's very own feeling of pain, 'my self' has perished. Having sensed a feeling of neither pleasure nor pain as 'my self,' then with the cessation of one's very own feeling of neither pleasure nor pain, 'my self' has perished.

Thus he assumes, assuming in the immediate present a self inconstant, entangled in pleasure and pain, subject to arising and passing away, he who says, 'Feeling is my self.' Thus in this manner, Ananda, one does not see fit to assume feeling to be the self.

Therefore the notion that 'feeling is my self' is refuted because feeling is impermanent, various (i.e. pleasant, unpleasant, and indifferent), and subject to arising and passing away, whereas a self would be permanent and unitary. The second possibility is refuted next:

"As for the person who says, 'Feeling is not the self: My self is oblivious [to feeling],' he should be addressed as follows: 'My friend, where nothing whatsoever is sensed (experienced) at all, would there be the thought, "I am"?'" [Ananda replies:] "No, lord." "Thus in this manner, Ananda, one does not see fit to assume that 'Feeling is not my self: My self is oblivious [to feeling].'"

The notion of self depends on self-reflexive awareness, and when feeling ceases, as is the case in the highly refined meditative attainment of cessation of perception and feeling, then there is no arising of the self-reflexive notion of 'I am.' Therefore the second possibility is shown to be inconsistent with any belief in a permanent empirical self also. And finally, the third possibility results in the same conclusion:

"As for the person who says, 'Neither is feeling my self, nor is my self oblivious [to feeling], but rather my self feels, in that my self is subject to feeling,' he should be addressed as follows: 'My friend, should feelings altogether and every way stop without remainder, then with feeling completely not existing, owing to the cessation of feeling, would there be the thought, "I am"?'" [Ananda replies:] "No, lord." "Thus in this manner, Ananda, one does not see fit to assume that 'Neither is feeling my self, nor is my self oblivious [to feeling], but rather my self feels, in that my self is subject to feeling.'"

Here we conclude that if feeling ceases, as is the case for an arahant's cessation without remainder (anupadisesa Nibbana), then the self-reflexive notion of 'I am' — and by extension any notion of self whatsoever — ceases as well. Thus, there can be no permanent empirical self.

With this insight-gnosis we can come to understand that ignorant identification with any or all conditioned phenomena as a 'self' or as the 'possessions of a self' is the root cause of unskillful fabricating and craving. Based on our previous use of the second method which enabled us to understand that unskillful fabricating and craving are causes of suffering, we can now conclude that if ignorant identification with conditioned phenomena ceased, then suffering would also cease, and thus, we have mentally discerned that there is definitely a truth of the cessation of suffering. And because we have already understood that ignorance is based on the mistaken identification with what is impermanent and prone to suffering, as being a permanent and satisfactory 'self' and the 'possessions of a self,' we can now conclude that ceasing all such ignorant identification through discernment of impermanence, suffering, not-self, and dependent origination is the truth of the path leading to the cessation of suffering. Moreover, through trial and error we can also come to experientially understand that ethical conduct (sila) and meditative stabilization of the mind (samadhi) are necessary prerequisites for the ceasing all ignorant identification with conditioned phenomena of body, mind, and environment.

So to summarize what we've discussed thus far: Firstly, we observe and analyze our experience into its various components which are the contents of experience, and categorize these phenomenal components accordingly. We clearly discern that these various phenomena are impermanent and prone to suffering (discernment of the first noble truth). Secondly, we observe the causal relationships amongst these various phenomena and discern that craving is a cause of suffering (partial discernment of the second noble truth). Thirdly, we conclude that these phenomena are not a self or the possessions of a self, and that such mistaken notions are the cause of unskillful fabricating, craving, and therefore, suffering (full discernment of the second noble truth). We also conclude that when this ignorance ceases, suffering will also cease (discernment of the third noble truth). And finally, we conclude that sustained, experiential discernment of impermanence, suffering, not-self, and dependent origination will lead to the cessation of ignorant identification, whereby we will no longer identify with conditioned phenomena of body, mind, and environment as being 'I' or 'mine.' We also come to realize through our ongoing attempts to maintain this discernment and nonidentification, that ethical conduct and meditative stability are essential for the maintenance of this insight, and that the three aggregations of ethics, meditation, and discernment have to become fully integrated (discernment of the fourth noble truth).

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